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I. Introduction 
 The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) constitutes the largest-scale experiment to date in 
government payments for ecosystem services.  Begun in 1985, the CRP currently idles approximately 30 
million acres – a land mass about the size of Mississippi – at an annual cost near $1.7 billion.  CRP 
participants are owners or operators of agricultural land that contract with the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) to idle their cropland from production and agree to install conservation-type 
covers for a period of 10- to 15-years.  Participants receive an annual payment, and for funding these 
payments, U.S. taxpayers receive ecosystem services that include enhancements to wildlife habitat, 
carbon sequestration, and benefits deriving from reduced soil erosion.  The program has been evaluated as 
having substantial positive benefits on net, yet perennially high local enrollment of large-scale cropland 
retirement is associated with negative effects on some rural communities including losses of jobs and 
farm-related businesses (Sullivan et al, 2004).  Anecdotally, the rural outmigration associated with CRP is 
said to permeate even to threaten the institution of 6-man football in small towns like Geraldine, Montana 
(Hardin 2003).     
The mechanism by which land is enrolled in the CRP has evolved over time.  It now consists of 
an elaborate bidding system in which landowners can make enrollment more likely by offering to idle 
crop production on land whose characteristics program administrators deem desirable, agreeing to engage 
in efforts that enhance the ecosystem services of the parcel, and by reducing the payment they receive.  
The evolved details of the bidding system are codified in the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI), a 
scoring system that weights the putative ecosystem services from a parcel and the rental rate demanded by 
the land owner.  A portion of each parcel’s EBI score is pre-determined by the federal government in the 
establishment of EBI factors and weights and is, therefore, exogenous to the landowner.  For example, 
land enrolled from areas determined to have particular conservation value, such as Conservation Priority 
Areas (CPAs), is given bonus points in the EBI.  These points produce an advantage in acceptance for the 
offers that receive them.  But part of the EBI score constitutes an endogenous choice by the landowner.  
Most notably, the per-acre rental rate bid by a landowner in his offer enters into the EBI with a negative 
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weight, and the more expensive parcels are moved down the priority list for enrollment.  The 
straightforward implication of this mix of exogenous and endogenous components of the EBI is that a 
landowner’s bid to enroll in the CRP will be chosen strategically to adapt to changes in the scoring 
mechanism.  When the EBI is revised to induce more enrollments from certain areas, the bid response 
from landowners in such areas will temper, or perhaps magnify, the area’s enrollment response, 
depending on the strategic choice of landowners.  Further, not only will the enrollment outcome depend 
upon the endogenous bid response to a change in the scoring mechanism, so too will the ultimate 
payments to landowners and the costs of the program to taxpayers. 
 This paper is about how a landowner’s bid to enroll in the CRP is influenced by his parcel’s 
designation as a Conservation Priority Area (CPA).  We present a theoretical model of a landowner’s 
optimal bid and demonstrate that the theoretical model results in an ambiguity in a landowner’s optimal 
bid response to CPA designations and other such exogenously determined points.  The bid choice is 
explored using a data set of the approximately 270,000 accepted and unaccepted offers from three CRP 
sign-up periods in 1997, 1998, and 2000.  We focus empirically on a subset of offers from the Prairie 
Pothole Conservation Priority Area and cluster offers by crop reporting district (CRD) to identify whether 
bid responses to exogenous EBI points differ across landowners from regions with varying opportunity 
costs to enrollment.   
 
II. Historical Perspective and Previous Analysis of the CRP 
There have been over 43 CRP enrollment periods, or sign-ups, since the program’s inception in 
1985.1   Qualifying agricultural lands, those with a previous cropping history and that meet certain soil 
and erodibility criteria, are enrolled under either general sign-up or continuous sign-up guidelines.  Both 
sign-up types require landowners to install and maintain one or more conservation-type covers on the 
parcel during the idle period.  In exchange, landowners are paid annually a per-acre rental rate for each 
parcel enrolled and a maintenance payment to partially offset the costs of maintaining the established 
cover.  The distinguishing features of each sign-up type are the land and cover types targeted and the 
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enrollment process each employs.  General sign-up enrollments are typically whole fields or large 
portions of fields idled to one or more covers such as native and introduced grasses, trees, wildlife habitat, 
and wildlife food plots. The continuous sign-up focuses on practices and covers to mitigate wind and 
water erosion on smaller portions of fields such as riparian buffers, shelterbelts, and other field and stream 
borders.  Landowners with eligible parcels can enroll in the continuous sign-up at any time at a known 
rental rate; however, general sign-up enrollments occur less frequently and include a competitive bidding 
process where enrollment is not certain.2  In the general sign-up, landowners are provided an incentive to 
lower their bids; there is no such incentive in the continuous sign-up.  This paper’s focus is the general 
sign-up CRP. 
Since its inception in 1985, the general sign-up CRP has undergone important changes in how it 
enrolls land and the information provided to landowners during bidding.  The first nine sign-up periods 
were general sign-ups between the spring of 1986 and summer of 1989.  Administered in the context of 
the 1985 Farm, the program’s primary objective was to reduce soil erosion.3  Multi-county “bid pools” 
were established, each with a predetermined number of acres to enroll and an undisclosed maximum bid 
for all offers within the pool.  During the offer solicitation period, the USDA did not provide information 
to landowners about how their offers would be prioritized for enrollment.  A landowner simply identified 
the parcel he wanted to enroll and submitted a bid and conservation cover proposal.  Enrollment for each 
bid pool was accomplished by selecting the lowest per-acre bid prices from among the offers received.   
The research that focused on CRP bidding behavior during these initial sign-up periods found that 
landowners who made offers to enroll did not account for expected future onsite productivity gains from 
reduced soil erosion in their bids (Miranda 1992) and were bidding in excess of their opportunity cost 
(Shoemaker 1989), resulting in higher program costs than what would have been required had landowners 
bid their opportunity cost (Reichelder and Boggess 1988, Smith 1995).4  Miranda (1992), Shoemaker 
(1989), and Reichelderfer and Boggess (1988) offered the explanation that landowners submitted bids in 
excess of their true opportunity cost in order to learn the maximum competitive bid and extract rents from 
the program.  Their explanations suggest that learning influences bid behavior by reducing uncertainty, 
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but they did not test directly for learning.  Smith (1995) used mechanism design theory under assumptions 
of information asymmetry to identify whether an offer system or auction to enroll lands is least-cost given 
the bid pools approach to enroll land into the CRP.  Smith showed that a non-linear price schedule based 
on farm size is optimal when the marginal return to land increases with farm size, but absent that, the 
government may not be able to do better than a single enrollment price (bid) per county.  The research 
from this period lent support for county-based pricing schemes as an alternative to the multi-county bid 
pools.  
 Sustainable agriculture emerged as a theme in the commodity and conservation titles of 1990 
Farm Bill, and the CRP’s objectives were expanded to include improvements in surface and ground water 
quality along with reductions in soil erosion.  Given the early criticisms over the use of the bid pools for 
general sign-ups 1 – 9 and the program’s targeting of multiple objectives, an index was developed 
(initially black box) and used in general sign-ups 10 – 13 that allowed the USDA to prioritize offers based 
on their ratio of expected environmental benefits to cost (Osborne 1993, Thurman 1995).5  Subsequently, 
research efforts turned to understanding the CRP’s ability to target multiple objectives in a cost-effective 
manner.  Babcock et al. (1996, 1997), using county average CRP bids to identify heterogeneity in the 
agricultural productivity of enrolled lands  and measures of the environmental quality of land, showed 
that wind erosion benefits are negatively correlated with land values while other environmental indicators 
such as surface water quality and water erosion are positively correlated with land values.  They 
concluded that when the targeted environmental benefits are positively correlated with land productivity, 
maximizing the acres enrolled in the CRP based on cost alone, like the targeting of the first 9 sign-ups, 
will perform poorly in terms of capturing environmental benefits.   
To this point, work that considered bidding behavior in the general sign-up CRP and strategies to 
target multiple program objectives advocated for an enrollment mechanism that prioritizes enrollments 
based on maximizing enrolled land’s benefit-to-cost ratio.  As a result of the language in the conservation 
title of the 1996 farm bill and the USDA’s interpretation of the program’s parameters, a new index – the 
Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) – was developed that permitted the USDA to prioritize general sign-
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up offers by a cost-adjusted environmental benefits measure.   The EBI includes five environmental 
factors and a cost factor, and it expands upon the prior index to include measures of expected benefits to 
wildlife and air quality. 6  The environmental score is based on the parcel’s physical properties and on the 
conservation cover chosen by the landowner; the environmental score is known to the landowner when he 
submits his offer to enroll.  The cost score is based on the rental rate bid by the landowner and parameters 
set by program administrators, and it is undetermined until after all offers are evaluated by the USDA.7  
For each offer, a maximum rental rate is calculated based on the parcel’s county and the NRCS rental 
values, which are intended to reflect the dry-land cash value of the predominant three soil series in their 
most productive use.  Because the maximum rental rate for a parcel is specific to the county-and-soil-
series combination, the maximum values for parcels even within the same county differ significantly.8  
When formulating a bid, the landowner knows his parcel’s environmental score and must bid at or below 
his parcel’s maximum rental rate.  Enrollment in the general sign-up CRP is competitive, and a landowner 
can receive additional cost factor EBI points for lowering his bid, a strategy that increases the likelihood 
that his offer will be accepted.  The offer’s total EBI score is the sum of its environmental and cost scores. 
As with the program’s prior enrollment schemes, identifying whether enrollment into the CRP by 
way of the EBI would achieve the program’s goals in a cost effective manner remained a research 
priority.   Bids analyzed from general sign-ups following implementation of the EBI revealed that 
landowners condition their bids on the environmental component of their EBI score (Marra and Vukina 
1998; Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts 2005; Vukina et al. 2008), and bids may include a premium above 
the “true” reservation rental rates for additional EBI points above a perceived minimum or threshold score 
(Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts 2005).  At least a portion of a bid’s premium may be attributed to the 
value landowners place on the perceived environmental benefits, particularly because higher EBI scores 
may signal improvements in the parcels’ future productivity (Marra and Vukina 1998; Vukina et al. 
2008).  Kirwan, Lubowski and Roberts (2005) also observed that estimated premiums implicit in the bids 
increased over time and stated that the behavior is consistent with diminished uncertainty over the 
minimum critical EBI score needed to gain acceptance, a sort of  learning over time.    
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In the present paper we analyze changes in landowners’ bids when the offers’ probability of 
acceptance is exogenously increased. The theoretical model follows closely that of Kirwan, Lubowski, 
and Roberts (2005), Marra and Vukina (1998), and Vukina et al. (2008), positing that landowners 
condition their bid on their perceived probability of acceptance based on expectations of their EBI score.  
Our model does not attempt to place structure on perception formulation but accommodates the situation 
where a landowner adjusts his bid based on his EBI score, expectations about program parameters, and 
learning.  As in previous work, our empirical model makes explicit the relationship between a 
landowner’s EBI score and his bid.  We extend previous empirical work by isolating an exogenous 
component of the total EBI score – conservation priority area points – to identify landowners’ optimal bid 
responses due to an exogenous increase in their probability of acceptance.  We allow the bid response to 
more EBI points to be positive or negative to exploit the ambiguity from the theoretical model.     
 
III. Theoretical Framework  
A landowner maximizes his expected returns from enrolling in the CRP by choosing his bid in an 
environment of uncertainty over the program parameters, which are determined by the government.  The 
bid a landowner makes is conditional on what he observes when his offer is submitted, which includes: 
the offer’s environmental score, the parcel’s maximum soil rental rate, his expectation of and preferences 
for on-farm and off-farm conservation benefits,  and his subjective evaluation of the strength of his offer 
relative to the other offers against which his competes. 
 
The Government’s Problem 
The CRP is an entitlement program, and as such, it enrolls land with a target number of acres in 
each sign-up.9  The government wants to enroll A  acres by choosing offers with the highest total EBI 
scores ( )e where e is computed using the landowner’s bid ( )r  and his offer’s environmental provision 
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( ) ,N fixed at the time the offers are reviewed.  An offer’s total EBI score is calculated using the 
following rule:  
(1) ( , )    ,r Ne r N r Nβ β= +   
where 0rβ <   and  0Nβ >  are program parameters set by the government that determine how the bid 
(cost) and conservation provisions are scored.10  The cost scoring parameter rβ  is set after offers are 
collected but prior to scoring; the environmental scoring parameters that determine Nβ are set prior to the 
sign-up and known to landowners before they submit their bids.  In this way, r and N  are substitutes in 
the production of the total EBI score.  Letting ( )g e describe the distribution of bids and acreage offered, 
the total acreage offered from the distribution of EBI scores is: 
 ( )
0
.g e de
∞∫   
The government may not know ( )g e but accepts offers with the highest total EBI scores until A  acres 
are enrolled, thus choosing the cut-off EBI ( )e∗  that enrolls A  acres.   
 ( ) .
e
g e de A
∗
∞
=∫   
The Landowner’s Problem 
The landowner’s problem is two-staged and reflects uncertainty over the government’s actions 
and the supply of competing acres.  The first-stage decision compares the returns to participating in the 
CRP with the alternative choice, agricultural production.11  If the landowner does not participate in the 
CRP, either because his offer was rejected or because he does not submit an offer, he receives an expected 
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annual profit, denoted ( ).E π  If instead the landowner submits an offer and is successful in enrolling 
into the CRP, he receives an annual return ( ) :CRPR  
 ( ) ,CRPR r b N= +   
 where ( )b N  denotes the landowner’s annual private net non-pecuniary benefit of participating in the 
CRP over the alternative.12, 13  Program rules cap the landowner’s bid at the parcel’s maximum rental rate 
( ) ,maxr  a per-acre maximum annual rent known to the landowner and based on the productivity of the 
parcel’s three predominant soil series and county cash rent values.14  Subject to the restriction that 
,maxr r≤ a landowner will not bid a rental rate that would leave him worse off in the program than out.  
Thus, the choice of r  must satisfy a participation condition: 
(2) ( ) ( ) ,  .CRP maxR r b N E r rπ≡ + ≥ ≤   
 Equation (2) implies that a landowner must be able to bid at least his expected returns from production 
less the non-rent benefits from participating in the CRP, or a bid will not be observed.    
Subject to the participation condition and rent restriction in equation (2), the second-stage 
decision is over the choice of an optimal bid ( )0 ,r  and therefore an optimal EBI ( )0 ,e   that maximizes 
the expected returns to enrollment.   The landowner knows there is a tradeoff between the increased CRP 
return that accompanies a higher bid against the lower probability of acceptance implied by the EBI score 
parameters.   Ex post, the offer is accepted if the EBI score ( )0e is at least that of the cut-off EBI ( )e∗ , so 
that ( )0 0 , ,e r N e∗≥ and it is rejected otherwise; this is deterministic.  Ex ante, the landowner is uncertain 
about the number of acres to be enrolled ( )A and the cost scoring parameter ( )rβ  and therefore does not 
know e∗  with certainty.   
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Confronted with uncertainty over the parameters established by the government, the landowner’s 
perceived probability of acceptance, denoted ( )0 ,F e  depends on his parcel’s environmental score, his 
beliefs about how his bid will be scored, and his beliefs over the strength of his parcel’s score relative to 
other applicants’ scores.  The USDA enrolls offers with the highest total EBI scores first; therefore, a 
landowner’s perceived probability of acceptance is increasing in his score ( )( )0 0F e′ > and decreasing in 
his bid.  Figure 1 provides one view of how a landowner might perceive the distribution of offers.  The 
landowner cannot know for sure where his EBI score is in the distribution.  However, learning about the 
program parameters from repeated experiences or shared information from others who have experience 
can influence a landowner’s offered rental rate.  If a landowner learns more about how his offers compare 
with others in the distribution, he incorporates that information in his bid decision.  While we do not test 
explicitly for the effects or presence of learning, we presume as in previous work that it is present and 
encapsulated in the bidding process.  Further, we carry forward the result of our theoretical model that 
learning does not necessarily imply that a landowner will increase his bid, only that more is revealed 
about the government’s parameters and other EBI scores against which his competes.     
 
Optimal rental rate choice and the implied optimal EBI 
For a fixed level of conservation services ( )N  provided by a parcel, the EBI formula in equation 
(1) determines a parcel’s EBI score as a linear function of the landowner’s bid.  We characterize the 
landowner’s problem as a choice of EBI score ( )0e  that maximizes his expected returns to participating 
in the CRP, expressed as:  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )0 0 01 .
oe
max ER F e r b N F e E π= + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦   
The problem can be recast to include the explicit tradeoff between his bid and EBI score from equation 
(1): 
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(3)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )00 01 .
o
N
e
r
e Nmax ER F e b N F e Eβ πβ
⎛ ⎞−= + + −⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition (FOC) is:  
(4) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )00 0
0
1 0.N
r r
e NdER F e b N E F e
de
β πβ β
⎛ ⎞−′≡ − + =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+   
The FOC expresses the equality of the marginal benefit (MB) and marginal cost (MC) due to a change in 
the bid and thus ( )0 ,e  expressed as: 
 ( ) ( )00 0 1MB ( )    and  MC ( ) .N
r r
e NF e b N E F eβ πβ β
⎛ ⎞− −′≡ − ≡⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+   
 For a given ,N  the landowner’s marginal benefit to increasing his EBI score ( )0 ,e  accomplished 
by decreasing his bid ( )0 ,r  is a “probability of acceptance effect”: the landowner substitutes a lower 
rental rate for a greater probability of acceptance that results from the higher EBI score.  This is non-
negative by the participation condition in equation (2).  The marginal cost of increasing 0e  is a “rental 
rate effect”: an increase in EBI score, achieved by reducing the bid, implies a reduction in CRP payments 
if the offer is accepted.  A landowner will reduce his bid to increase his EBI score to the point at which 
the marginal benefit of doing so is just equal to the marginal cost.  Corner solutions are possible when the 
marginal benefit of a change in EBI score equates to the marginal cost given a bid lower than the 
maximum bid ( )0 maxr r> .  But participation is not ruled out if the participation condition is satisfied and 
the marginal benefits exceeds the marginal cost for a bid at its maximum ( )0 .maxr r=   
 The goal is to understand what the theoretical model predicts will be a landowner’s optimal bid 
adjustment in response to an exogenous increase in his environmental score through an increase in .N   
The total differential  of equation (1) characterizes this response: 
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(5)    0 0
1 .N
r
dr de
d N d N
ββ
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
Given the parameter restrictions assigned previously, the direction of the bid change due to an increase in 
environmental points, 0 ,dr
d N
depends on the sign and size of the adjustment in the EBI score from an 
increase in environmental points.  The total differential of the FOC in equation (4) implies that a 
landowner’s EBI adjustment, accomplished by a bid response, in response to a change in .N  is:  
(6) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0
0
0
0 0
1
2
.
N
r
N
r r
F
de
d e
F e b E F
e
N N N e
β
β
β
β βπ
′
−′′ ′+ − +
= ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
   
The denominator in equation (6) is the second order sufficient condition for a maximum, guaranteed to be 
negative at the optimum by concavity conditions, and the entire expression is positive.  An exogenous 
increase in a parcel’s environmental score unambiguously increases the parcel’s EBI score.  However, the 
bid change expressed in equation (5) cannot be signed and depends on the size of the EBI adjustment 
relative to the program’s other parameters.  Further, it can be shown that  
2
0
2 0,
d r
dN
>  which says that 
landowners with higher environmental scores have more positive bid responses to further increases in 
their environmental score.   The major result we highlight is that an exogenous increase in a parcel’s 
environmental score leads to an ambiguous adjustment in the landowner’s bid ( )0r but an unambiguous 
increase in the parcel’s overall EBI score ( )0 .e  The composite effect of an exogenous increase in 
environmental points and an optimal positive or negative bid adjustment is a higher EBI score and, 
therefore, a higher probability of acceptance.15   
The ambiguity of the bid response to an exogenous change in N  makes it a fundamentally 
empirical question. That the theoretical model cannot predict the direction of response has important 
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practical implications to program administrators and underscores the competitive incentives conveyed by 
use of the EBI during general sign-ups.  Prior research on CRP bidding behavior observed increases in 
bids over time and estimated premiums to landowners in excess of their true opportunity cost in the CRP, 
positing that learning over time resulted in less uncertainty in bidding which led high-EBI landowners to 
increase their bids.  This model and the comparative statics that derive from it give footing to counter the 
view that CRP bidders are not incentivized to reduce their bids in the current offer selection scheme.   
 
IV. Identification, Data and Empirical Model 
We test the ambiguities of the theoretical model using contract level Conservation Reserve 
Program offers data to investigate how an exogenous change in EBI points affect landowners’ bids.  We 
accomplish this by exploiting the structure of the EBI.  The EBI used for general sign-ups 16, 18 and 20 
was subdivided into six environmental ranking factors (N1 – N6) and a cost factor (N7).  Each 
environmental ranking factor provides a basis for scoring the offer based on three criteria:  the parcel’s 
physical characteristics, its location, or what the landowner proposes to do on the parcel (the conservation 
cover or practice choice).  Parcel characteristics and location are exogenous to the landowner and fixed; 
the conservation practice he proposes to install represents an endogenous choice.  Table 1 provides a 
description of the ranking factors and the criteria type for each.  For example, the N1 factor points an 
offer receives – points presumed to indicate the offer’s provision of wildlife habitat benefits – depends on 
all three types of criteria: the cover established, the parcel’s characteristics, and the location of the parcel. 
Thus, N1 points are both endogenous and exogenous to the landowner.  The only ranking factor for which 
points are determined solely by a parcel’s location during general sign-ups 16, 18, and 20 is the N6 
component: conservation priority areas.  Conservation priority areas (CPAs) are designated regions in 
which an environmental concern (air, water, or wildlife related) has been identified.  In the EBI, the N6 
priority area factor awards 25 points to eligible offers inside a designated priority area.  CPA boundaries 
are county boundaries, and offers from a county designated as being in the CPA can receive the priority 
area points.  Thus, the conservation priority area ranking factor permits a clean identification strategy for 
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testing bid responses to exogenous EBI points.  The priority area we explore here is the Prairie Pothole 
CPA. 
 
  A.  Data 
Offers from the Prairie Pothole region of the United States to enroll in the CRP for general sign-
ups 16, 18 and 20 are used to implement empirical tests of the theory.  The data contain each offer’s 
environmental ranking scores for N1 through N6, its parcel’s maximum rental rate, and the landowner’s 
bid price.  The advantage of these data over county averages or information from only the accepted offers 
is that we observe the behavior of all landowners who attempt to enroll in the program, not just 
landowners who are successful in enrolling.  These sign-ups were selected because they represent three 
coterminous general sign-ups in which the EBI scoring rubrics were the same.   Further, the EBI weights 
and points were unchanged over these sign-up periods, so we can be sure that landowners’ bidding 
behavior is not confounded by effects on bids due to known changes in the environmental component 
scores.   
The Prairie Pothole region (see figure 2) was established as a priority area in the CRP prior to the 
16th general sign-up and covers portions of Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota.  
Combined, these states account for approximately 35% of the land enrolled in the CRP.  In the Prairie 
Pothole CPA, The priority of concern in the Prairie Pothole region is in preservation or re-establishment 
of “potholes” left behind by glacial recessions. In their natural state, the potholes act as important aquatic 
reserves, they enhance drainage systems, are rich in plant and aquatic life, and provide breeding, nesting, 
and migratory support to waterfowl species.  Other priority areas have been established such as the 
Longleaf Pine and the Chesapeake Bay CPAs.  The Prairie Pothole region is chosen for our analysis 
because it overlaps with a substantial agricultural production region that historically has consistent 
participation in the CRP.   
The CRP’s Prairie Pothole conservation priority area is defined using county boundaries, so each 
county can be identified as being either a “Prairie Pothole county” or a “non-Prairie Pothole county.” To 
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identify the effects on bids from changes in exogenous EBI points, we exploit that the CPA uses as its 
boundaries county lines and group together for our analysis offers Prairie Pothole counties and non-
Prairie Pothole counties that all are also in the same Crop Reporting District (CRD).  A CRD, as defined 
by the National Agricultural Statistics Service, is a grouping of contiguous counties within a state and 
have common agricultural production characteristics.  We assume that landowners within a CRD, 
regardless of whether they are in a Prairie Pothole designated county or not, are homogenous in their 
factor input prices, output prices, production alternatives, weather risk, and other characteristics that are 
known in practice to matter to the CRP participation decision.  Our analysis examines offers within a 
single crop reporting district (CRD) in a single sign-up period by comparing offers that received the 25 
priority area points (N6 factor points) with those in the same CRD that did not.16    Our data do not 
identify other land and owner characteristics that may matter to CRP participation such as age of operator, 
succession and estate plans, total farm size, and spread of the farming operation.      
To see how Prairie Pothole (PP = 1) and non-Prairie Pothole  (PP = 0) offers differ within the 
CRDs, we report for each summaries of bids, maximum rental rates, discounts in bids from their 
maximums, and the environmental component of EBI scores in Table 2.   17  The reported environmental 
score here includes the sum of the factor points for N1 through N5 and does not include the CPA points 
(N6).  Recalling that low bids (rental rates) and high environmental scores substitute in producing a high 
EBI score, it is useful to differentiate CRDs as high-rent or low-rent and having high or low 
environmental scores.  Generally speaking, CRDs in Iowa and CRD 2750 in Minnesota are high-rent 
areas with high environmental scores, while CRDs in Montana and North Dakota are low-rent areas with 
relatively low environmental scores.  CRD 2710 in Minnesota and CRDs 3050 and 3030 in Montana are 
low-rent with environmental scores higher than the other low-rent CRDs.  Offers from the high-rent 
CRDs, despite their disadvantage in the cost component of the EBI, have high environmental scores and 
are able to participate in the CRP as a result.  Conversely, offers from the low-rent regions have lower 
environmental scores but get an EBI boost from the cost factor that allows them to participate.  It is 
basically true that the priority-area offers in high-rent CRDs have higher maximum rental rates than do 
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the non-priority-area offers but have bids that are more heavily discounted relative to their maximums.  
Conversely, Prairie Pothole offers in low-rent regions tend to have bids closer to their maximums and 
lower maximum rental rates compared to non-Prairie Pothole bids and maximum rental rates.    
The pattern that emerges is that offers from CRDs with the highest bids are more discounted from 
their maximum rental rates and also have the highest environmental EBI points.  Also, landowners who 
receive the Prairie Pothole CPA points, when compared with those that do not, bid a greater discount 
from their maximum if they are from a high-rent region with high environmental scores  but discount less 
if from low-rent regions with also lower environmental scores.  To determine whether Prairie Pothole bids 
are statistically different on average from bids outside the CPA in the same region, we conduct equality of 
means tests on the average maximum rental rates, bids, and bid discounts for each CRD.  Test statistics 
and significance levels of the tests are provided in Table 3; equality of the maximum rental rates and bids 
is rejected in all CRDs.18  The idea that average bids and the discount in bids from their maximum rate 
within even a small geographical area such as a CRD are the same is not supported by the data.  Further, 
these statistics suggest that the bid response may depend on whether the landowner is in a high-
environmental-score or a low-environmental-score situation, a result predicted by the theoretical model 
and comparative statics results in equation (6). 
Submitted offers compete in a national pool for limited acres based on their total EBI score.  In 
every general sign-up that has occurred since and including sign-up 15, there have been more acres 
offered for enrollment than accepted.  In addition to this nationally competitive factor where enrollment is 
capped at some ex-ante unknown level, the program statutes limit total county enrollment at any given 
time to a maximum of 25% of a county’s agricultural land.  This creates a local constraint, and stronger 
local competition influences the bidding behavior of landowners.  Landowners know there is a maximum 
enrollment per county and, beyond their own observation about local CRP acres, have access to 
information about how competitive CRP acreage in their county may be, the current enrollment, and 
contract expirations either online or by way of FSA staff.  To the extent that landowners seek out this 
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information or casually observe it, it will be incorporated into their subjective evaluation of their own 
probability of acceptance through ( ) ,F e and their bids may be conditioned accordingly.   
We construct the proportion of the county’s agricultural land that is enrolled in the CRP at the 
time of the sign-up to identify the degree of competition for enrollment in the counties within a CRD.  
Table 4 reports, for each CRD, the range and mean of its counties’ proportion of agricultural land enrolled 
in the CRP just prior to each of the three sign-ups.  There are 36 counties represented in the three Iowa 
CRDs 1950, 1940, and 1910, and among these, only one had enrollment greater than 10% of its 
agricultural land base prior to the sign-up.  During this time, average enrollment in the Prairie Pothole 
region of Iowa was approximately 4% of agricultural land; therefore, it is unlikely that CRP bidders in 
Iowa perceived a high degree of competition for CRP enrollment during these sign-ups.  However, 
bidders in counties within CRDs like 2710 (Minnesota), 3030 (Montana), and 3890, 3830, and 3860 in 
North Dakota may have perceived a locally competitive market for CRP lands and incorporated such into 
their optimal bid strategy.     
 
B.  An Empirical Model of the Effects of EBI Points on Bids 
The theoretical model identified an ambiguity in landowners’ bid responses to exogenous 
environmental EBI points that we wish to investigate empirically.  Summary statistics of bids, bid 
discounts from the maximum rental rates, and the institutional features of the program suggest an 
empirical specification to test whether bidding behavior is influenced by the exogenous Prairie Pothole 
CPA points.  We investigate this bidding behavior by estimating a model that relates the submitted CRP 
bid ( )r to the parcel’s  maximum rental rate ( )maxr , its environmental EBI score excluding priority area 
points ( )ebi , and the proportion of the county currently enrolled in the CRP ( ).comp   We include a 
Prairie Pothole priority area dummy variable ( )PP  that is equal to one if the offer is in the priority area  
and zero otherwise.19  By interacting the binary Prairie Pothole variable with the parcel’s environmental 
18 
 
score, the relationship between the bid and the EBI points is dependent on the offer’s CPA designation.  
The empirical model is 
(7) 1 2 1 2 3 ,
max
i i i i i i ir r ebi PP PP ebi compα β β δ δ β ε= + + + + ⋅ + +   
where subscript i indexes individual offers within a CRD.     
The identification assumption of our empirical model is that landowners in a crop reporting 
district (CRD) on one side of a Conservation Priority Area (CPA) boundary are not systematically 
different with respect to the non-CPA determinants of their bidding behavior from those on the other side 
of the boundary,  conditional on the bid-relevant characteristics of  the bidder’s specific maximum rental 
rate (specific to bidders because it varies by soil) and conditional on the county’s enrollment level 
(relevant due to the 25% cap in county enrollment in the CRP).  The residual heterogeneity in bidding 
behavior is captured in the model’s error term.  Our assumption of the exogeneity of CPA designation 
(conditional on maximum rental rate and county enrollment) is supported to the extent that a CRD is 
homogenous in its production opportunities and factor markets.  Landowners within a few counties of 
each other face similar factor input prices, output prices, production alternatives, weather risk, and other 
characteristics that, in practice, are known to matter to the CRP participation decision.  This is consistent 
with the National Agricultural Statistics Service’s (NASS’s) rationale for grouping counties into CRDs.20 
By conducting our analysis at the CRD level and for each sign-up period separately, we are invoking this 
assumption. 
In the model, the maximum bid a landowner can submit ( )maxir plays an important role as a 
measure of the parcel’s opportunity cost of enrolling in the CRP.  The maximum rental rate reflects the 
dry-land cash value of the land in its most productive agricultural use and is based on the soils present on 
the parcel.  It is also a control for the obvious heterogeneity among offers within a CRD.21  In this respect, 
we expect a positive relationship between ir  and .maxir   Another important control variable used here is 
the degree of competition for CRP enrollment in a county, captured by the covariate .comp   There are 
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several counties within a single crop reporting district, and each county faces a constraint that no more 
than 25% of its agricultural land can be enrolled in the CRP at a given time.22  When landowners perceive 
this constraint to be effectual, they adjust their own subjective probability of acceptance into the program, 
altering their optimal bid.  
Landowners condition their bid on their offer’s EBI score (Marra and Vukina 1998, Kirwan et al. 
2005, Vukina et al. 2008), and our model incorporates this.  We decompose each offer’s environmental 
EBI score by separating the non-priority area environmental points an offer receives, iebi  from the 
priority area points, iPP ,  to see if the priority area points result in a treatment effect on bids that differs 
from the marginal effect of other environmental EBI points.  Our theoretical results suggest that the 
marginal effect of exogenous points such as priority area points on bids can be positive or negative 
depending on the landowner’s subjective evaluation of his offer’s strength, in terms of EBI, relative to 
others. The interaction term ( 2δ ) captures the treatment effect associated with being in a priority area.  
Differentiating the empirical model (eq. 7) with respect to both ebi and PP  and evaluating the marginal 
effects at the sample means of each isolates two effects of interest: 
(8) 2 2 1
r PP
ebi
β δ η∂ = + ≡∂   
(9) 1 2 2.
r ebi
PP
δ δ η∂ = + ≡∂   
The marginal effect of environmental EBI points on the bid (Eq. 8) is given by 1;η  the marginal effect of 
priority area points on the bid (equation 9) is denoted 2.η We estimate these marginal effects directly by 
reparameterizing equation (7) via substitution of equations (8) and (9), resulting in the regression 
equation: 
(10) ( )( )1 1 2 2 3 .maxi i i i i i ir r ebi PP PP PP ebi ebi compα β η η δ β ε⎡ ⎤= + + + + − − + +⎣ ⎦   
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Each CRP sign-up provides a rich cross-sectional dataset, which we exploit to measure the effects 
of variation in maximum rental rates, CPA designations, and environmental scores across observations on 
CRP bids.  We observe the offers of all landowners for whom the participation condition in equation (2) 
is met; however, we cannot link a single landowner within the same sign-up period or in other sign-ups.  
Our empirical identification strategy is to estimate separate models for each combination of three sign-ups 
and thirteen crop reporting districts.  Separate analyses by sign-ups allow for time-varying effects, and 
separate analyses across CRDs holds constant the idiosyncratic geographic factors that cause bidding 
behavior to vary, thereby identifying the effects within CRDs of designation as a Conservation Priority 
Area. 
Each bid is constrained to be equal to or less than the parcel’s maximum rental value ( ).maxr  We 
observe landowners who bid their maximum and others who bid less than their maximum.  For those in 
the former group, we cannot know whether their bid at the maximum is their optimal bid or whether they 
would prefer to bid a value larger than their maximum if their decision were unconstrained by the 
program’s rules.  The result is a nontrivial mass of bids (the dependent variable) that are constrained but 
otherwise are continuous over other values.  This suggests an underlying latent variable and limited 
dependent variable model, the form of which is: 
 ( )min , .max
r x u
r r r
β∗
∗
= +
=   
We observe maxr r=  when it is optimal to bid the maximum rental rate and also when a landowner would 
bid more than the maximum but cannot.  We otherwise observe r r∗= whenever the optimal bid is less 
than the maximum.  Optimality relies on the expected returns to participating in the CRP over the 
expected returns to the next best alternative use for the land.  We deal with this complication by 
estimating maximum likelihood censored regression models (Tobin 1958) for equation (10).23  Our 
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estimator incorporates observation-specific censoring so that the censored value of the observed bid ( )ir  
is the parcel’s maximum rental rate ( ).maxir 24     
 
C.  Empirical Results 
Estimated marginal effects – the variables’ effect on the bid conditional on the observation not 
being censored – evaluated at the variable means are provided for each sign-up and CRD combination in 
tables 5a, 5b and 5c.25   The marginal effect on bids of higher county-level enrollment given the USDA’s 
rule that CRP enroll not more than 25% of a county’s agricultural land is an interesting question. While 
the effect is not fully explored in this paper, we do incorporate the variable that measures the proportion 
of a county’s agricultural land enrolled in CRP ( )comp  to control for its effect on bid behavior.  With 
two exceptions in each of sign-ups 16 and 18, the statistically significant estimated marginal effects are 
negative, indicating that landowners reduce their bids to compete for dwindling county-level enrollment 
space in the CRP.     
 
The Role of Maximum Rental Rates on Bids 
A parcel’s maximum rental rate ( )maxir  is important in explaining the variation in observed bids.  
The reasons are two:  landowners know the maximum rental rate they can bid and, by construction, the 
maximum reflects the agricultural productivity of the land.  For our purposes, this parcel-specific measure 
is useful as a control for unobserved heterogeneity between offers.  A bid at its maximum rental rate can 
be described as constrained in the sense that the landowner cannot increase his bid in response to a change 
in his environmental EBI points or subjective evaluation of his offer relative to others.  We cannot know 
for sure which landowners or the proportion of these landowners that would submit a higher bid if they 
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were not constrained and we further recognize that a bid at its maximum is not guaranteed to be less than 
the landowner’s optimal bid. 
The proportion of a CRD’s bids at their maximum is reported for each sign-up and CRD in tables 
5a, 5b, and 5c.  A large proportion of bids at or very close to their maximum may lead to uninformative or 
imprecisely estimated Tobit marginal estimates, and this will be revealed in the standard errors and 
statistical significance of the estimates.  In North Dakota CRD 3860 during sign-18, for example, 85% of 
the bids are at the maximum; however, there are a number of bids well below their maximum on which 
Tobit marginal effects can be estimated.  In this case, the estimates and reported standard errors identify 
statistically significant marginal effects.  The extreme case occurs when, in Montana CRD 3050 during 
sign-ups 18 and 20 for example, all of the Prairie Pothole bids are constrained and the marginal effects 
cannot be estimated.   
The incidence of bids at their maximums increases in sign-ups 18 and 20 relative to sign-up 16, 
and there are a number of things that could contribute to this.  The sign-ups we consider occur within a 
few years of each other (1997 – 2000).  It is possible that landowners who gained experience bidding in 
sign-up 16 used that experience to increase their bids in sign-ups 18 and 20.  This type of learning is one 
explanation.   However, whether this is a result of landowners learning about programmatic parameters to 
extract rent premiums from the program cannot be identified with the data available, and we caution 
against drawing this conclusion in the absence of individual panel data to directly test for learning.26  
Based on the timing of these sign-ups, the increase in bids relative to their maximum is can alternatively 
be explained by other circumstances:  the parcels enrolled into the CRP during the first five years of the 
program were expiring during this time and eligible for another round of bidding (reenrolling), the least 
costly lands in terms of landowners’ opportunity costs were already enrolled, land values may have been 
increasing during this period, and perhaps the NRCS maximum soil rental rates were not recently updated 
to reflect agricultural production conditions.  
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Tobit marginal effects reveal that in all CRDs and sign-ups, landowners’ bids ( )ir  are 
conditioned on the maximum rental rates ( ).maxir    However, the magnitudes of these marginal effects are 
not constant for all CRDs, an indication of the heterogeneity that exists between landowners from 
different regions, and there is not a one-to-one effect on landowners’ bids.  In the high rent CRDs (IA and 
MN), a $1 increase in maximum rental rates induces a $0.40 to $0.55 increase in the bids.  In the lower 
rent areas such as ND and MT, the marginal effects on bids from a $1 increase in the maximum rental rate 
range from $0.05 to about $0.23, markedly lower than in the higher rental rate areas but generally greater 
relative to the region’s rental rates.  A test of the restriction that the marginal effect of an increase in 
maximum rental rates creates an equal increase in bids ( )0 1: 1H β = is rejected in all CRDs and sign-ups 
(table 6).  Also, the ceteris paribus increase in bids due to an increase in maximum rental rates is 
generally smaller in sign-ups 18 and 20 compared with sign-up 16.      
Taken together, the summary statistics and estimated marginal effect on bids from maximum 
rental rates convey that high-rent landowners bid further below their maximum than do low-rent 
landowners, but their bid response to an increase in the maximum rental rate is generally greater in 
absolute terms.  Recalling that the high-rent landowners in our data also have high environmental scores, 
this result is expected.  Owners of high-valued land are penalized in the EBI cost factor because the 
primary weighted component in the cost scoring factor does not consider the maximum soil rental rate of 
the parcel but instead applies equally to all offers a maximum rent the USDA is willing to pay in the 
particular sign-up.   Landowners perceive this penalty and bid further below their maximum rental rate in 
an attempt to increase their probability of acceptance.   Because they have relatively high environmental 
scores, a further increase in maximum rates is met with an increase in bids that is less than they could 
have taken, a strategy that increases their probability of acceptance while still increasing their returns to 
participating if they are accepted.  The low-rent landowners who also have low environmental scores 
respond strategically to an increase in the maximum rental rate by increasing their bid by a small amount, 
thus improving their chance of a successful enrollment. 
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The Effect of Additional Environmental EBI Points on Bids 
 A feature of our theoretical model is that landowners condition their bids on their EBI scores, and 
the model predicts that higher EBI landowners will have higher rental rate responses to additional EBI 
points than will lower EBI landowners.  In response to one additional EBI point, which increases his 
probability of acceptance and the expected return to participating in the CRP, a landowner can increase 
his bid with an offsetting reduction in his EBI.  Landowners from high-rent areas increase their bid more 
than landowners from low-rent areas because doing so doesn’t decrease by much their probability of 
acceptance.  Further, if their offer is accepted, the strategy guarantees a higher payment.  On the other 
hand, low-rent landowners receive an increase in their probability of acceptance via additional EBI points 
and increase their bid by a small amount such that their net probability of acceptance is greater than 
before the additional points.  These optimal adjustments derive from the marginal benefits and costs 
involved in increasing a bid and a landowner’s perception about the relative strength of his EBI score. 
We calculate the estimated marginal effect on bids of an additional environmental EBI point 
( )iebi  from the coefficient estimate of 1η in the reparameterized empirical model in equation (10).  The 
estimated marginal effects provide evidence that landowners condition their bids on their environmental 
scores, and in response to an increase in their environmental EBI points, high-rent landowners increase 
their bids by more than to landowners from low-rent areas.  Iowa and Minnesota are not just high rent 
areas but also have higher environmental EBI points than do regions in North Dakota and Montana.  
Adjusting for the scaling of the variable values of ,iebi our results suggest that the average CRP bidder in 
Iowa CRD 1950 during sign-up 16 increased his bid by approximately $0.04 (0.962 ÷ 25) for each 
additional environmental point.  An average bidder in the same sign-up in CRD 3830 increased his bid 
$0.01 (0.257 ÷ 25) for the same EBI point increase.   Though each CRD’s per-EBI-point premium is not 
consistent over time, the high-rent CRDs consistently have a more positive bid response to additional 
environmental points than their low-rent counterparts.  Further, with the exception of Minnesota CRD 
25 
 
2710, we find positive and statistically significant marginal effects of additional environmental points on 
bids in at least two of the three sign-up periods.  It is puzzling that a consistent relationship does not 
emerge across sign-ups between a landowner’s environmental score and his bid.  The high proportion of 
constrained bids in the low-rent CRDs as well as influences from the agricultural economy at the time 
could be determining factors.  
 
The Effect of Prairie Pothole CPA Points on Bids 
 We use the Prairie Pothole Conservation Priority Area designation to compare participants’ bid 
responses, relative to other landowners homogenous in their factor input prices, output prices, production 
alternatives, weather risk, and other characteristics that are known in practice to matter to the CRP 
participation decision, to an exogenous increase in environmental EBI points.  In the reparameterized 
empirical model in equation (10), the coefficient estimate of 2η evaluated at the variables’ means is the 
marginal effect on bids from receiving the Prairie Pothole priority area points.   
Two observations emerge:  the estimated bid response to Prairie Pothole CPA points does not 
mirror the marginal effects on bids from the other environmental points in the EBI, and the estimated bid 
response to CPA points can be negative.  Considering the latter point, it is generally true that the marginal 
effect of CPA points on bids is greater in the high-rent areas than in low-rent areas.  However, in sign-ups 
18 and 20, negative coefficient estimates indicate that landowners optimally reduced their bids relative to 
their non-priority-area counterparts.  While initially this might seem anomalous, our theory explains this 
type of behavior.  Landowners maximize the expected return from participating in the CRP, and the 
exogenous increase in points can be enhanced by the marginal benefit of a bid reduction.  A bid reduction 
in response to additional EBI points is optimal if the increase in the subjective probability of acceptance, 
accomplished by increasing the cost factor points (N7), is greater than the reduction in the return to 
participating in the CRP if the offer is accepted.  Estimates from the Iowa CRDs indicate that as a result 
of being in the Prairie Pothole designated priority area, the average bid was increased $5.02 in Iowa CRD 
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1940 during sign-up 16 and reduced $4.05 during sign-up 18.  CRP bidders from the Prairie Pothole CPA 
in Minnesota CRD 2710 bid an average of $1.02 more than their non-CPA counterparts during sign-up 16 
but $2.33 less in sign-up 20.    Conversely, Prairie Pothole bidders from North Dakota CRD 3830 bid 
$0.76 higher on average compared with non-Prairie Pothole bidder during sign-up 16; that gap increased 
to $2.85 in sign-up 20.  While we do observe high-rent CPA landowners reducing their bids relative to the 
non-CPA bidders, we do not observe similar bid reductions in the low rent regions.  Low-rent landowners 
have an advantage in the cost component formula; they may not perceive a large enough increase in their 
probability of acceptance from lowering their bid compared with the reduction in payments if their offer 
is accepted.  Landowners may also perceive that, because they are in a priority area, their participation 
conveys a greater environmental or conservation value, and they demand a higher return for providing it. 
 
Not all EBI Points are Created Equal 
 In the EBI scoring mechanism, a point is a point whether it is a priority area environmental point, 
a non-priority environmental point or a cost factor point.  However, the estimated bid response to Prairie 
Pothole priority-area points does not mirror the marginal effect on bids from the other environmental EBI 
points, suggesting that landowners may view these points differently.  We impose a restriction in the 
empirical model in equation (10) to test for equality of the marginal effects on bids from priority area 
points and non-priority area points, forcing 1 2.η η=   Failure to reject the null hypothesis of the restriction 
is evidence that landowners condition their bids on priority area points in the same manner as the non-
priority area environmental points.  Table 6 provides restricted estimates of Wald statistics from the 
restriction that non-priority area environmental EBI points are equal to the priority-area environmental 
EBI points.  In over half of the CRDs in sign-ups 16, 18 and 20, we reject the hypothesis that the marginal 
effects on bids from these two point sources are statistically equivalent.  Landowners who receive the 
Prairie Pothole priority area points perceive them to be somehow different than other environmental EBI 
points when deciding their optimal bid.  In low-rent regions like North Dakota and Montana, the restricted 
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estimates are predominantly negative and become more negative in each sign-up period.  This signals that 
an increase in priority-area points results in a more positive effect on rental rates than does an increase in 
non-priority area points.  The estimated Tobit marginal effects from tables 5a, 5b, and 5c support this.  
However, the statistically significant restriction estimates from CRDs in high-rent regions become less 
negative in each sign-up period.  These bidders are leveraging the Prairie Pothole CPA points to reduce 
their bids or increase them by a small amount, a strategy which results in a higher probability of 
acceptance and expected return from participating in the CRP.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 The CRP general sign-up enrolls land by calculating an Environmental Benefits Index value for 
each parcel; this value is intended to reflect the level of environmental services provided by removing the 
land from agricultural production, and it takes into account the rental rate bid by the landowner should his 
offer be accepted.  The landowner’s bid enters with a negative weight, and parcels with the highest total 
EBI points are accepted.  Some of the environmental service points in the EBI depend upon the 
conservation cover the landowner proposes to install, while some EBI points are entirely exogenous to the 
landowner.  Falling into the latter category are points resulting from land residing in Conservation 
Priority Areas like the Prairie Pothole region.  Such lands are given favor in the CRP enrollment process 
due strictly to the enhanced environmental services provided by retiring land in a certain location.   
We present a theoretical model that describes a landowner’s bidding behavior and characterizes 
the optimal bid adjustment when additional exogenous EBI points are given.  The model predicts that 
landowners condition their bid on the environmental EBI score of their parcel and on their subjective 
evaluation of the strength of their score relative to other offers against which they compete.  It also 
predicts that bidders with high environmental EBI scores will have a more positive bid response to 
additional points.  Because of the uncertainty over certain scoring parameters and other offers, a 
landowner will optimally increase or decrease his bid in response to receiving additional exogenous 
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environmental EBI points.  Regardless of the direction of the bid adjustment, the expected return from 
participating in the CRP is greater after the bid adjustment.   
Landowners’ bid responses are explored empirically using a data set of accepted and unaccepted 
offers from three CRP general sign-up periods.  Offers are clustered by crop reporting district to identify 
whether bid responses to exogenous EBI points differ across landowners from regions with varying 
opportunity costs to enrollment.  Because each landowner’s bid is constrained by a maximum rate unique 
to his parcel, and a mass of bids are at their maximum, we use a censored regression estimation strategy.   
Bid summary statistics and regression estimates of the marginal effect on bids from maximum rental rates 
convey that high-rent landowners bid further below their maximum than do low-rent landowners, but 
their bid response to an increase in the maximum rental rate is generally greater in absolute terms.  
Contrary to popular criticisms of the program, we find that landowners may not increase their bid by an 
amount equal to the increase in the maximum they are allowed to bid.   
Our empirical work addresses two aspects of the interaction between exogenous Prairie Pothole 
Conservation Priority Area points and endogenous rental rate bids.  Specifically, we measure how bids 
respond to the additional environmental EBI points awarded to bids within the CPA and test whether 
landowners in the priority area condition their bids on EBI points differently than do landowners outside 
of the priority area. As our theory suggests, we find that the non-priority area environmental points induce 
greater bids, in general.  Further, the response to additional EBI points depends on whether the bids are 
from high-rent or low-rent areas.  This response derives from the theory, which highlights the trade-offs 
faced by landowners between the benefits of a high bid should the offer be enrolled and the benefits from 
a low bid in increasing the probability of acceptance.  This trade-off creates opportunities for those from 
low-rent areas to increase their expected return to enrolling with small increases in their bid while 
landowners from high-rent areas optimally increase their bid by larger amounts.  We also find empirically 
that variations in priority area EBI points do not have the same impact on bids as do non-priority area 
points, despite their equivalence in their contributions to the EBI score.  
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CRP bidders face a trade-off in the EBI scoring mechanism between a higher bid and lower EBI 
points, and the trade-off incentivizes them to optimally reduce or increase their bids depending on their 
own subjective evaluation of the strength of their offer.   It is very likely that other factors, in particular 
learning effects over time, influence their perceptions and bidding behavior.  Local competition for 
enrollment is another factor that enters into landowners’ bidding strategies.  Revision to the EBI are often 
intended to induce more enrollment from certain areas, and the bid response from landowners in such 
areas will temper (or, perhaps, magnify) the area’s enrollment response depending on the strategic choice 
of landowners.  Not only will the enrollment outcome depend upon the endogenous bid response to a 
change in the scoring mechanism, so too will the ultimate payments to landowners and the costs of the 
program to taxpayers.  As program administrators and policymakers consider changes to the CRP such as 
acreage reductions and EBI scoring changes, consideration of landowners’ strategic bid responses will be 
useful in predicting enrollment and overall program costs.  In times when the Federal deficit is large and 
budgets are tight, knowing the sources and effects of landowners’ strategic decisions, as developed in this 
study, become more important and should help to ensure a more cost-effective implementation of the 
CRP program. 
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Figure 1. A landowner’s probability of acceptance into the CRP is increasing in his EBI 
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Table 1.  General sign-up EBI factors and sub factors 1 
N-Factor Description Explanation Criteria Type(s) 16 18 20
N1 Wildlife Habitat Benefits Up to 50 pts for the cover established and 
other points for proximity to  permanent 
water, restored wetlands or protected 
habitat, benefits to endagered species, and 
food plots.
Cover, Location, Parcel (0-100) (0-100) (0-100)
N2 Water Quality Benefits Up to 40 pts based on sheet/rill index and 
proximity to population served by 
watershed; up to 20 pts for soil leach index 
and proximity to population surved by 
groundwater; pts for cropped wetland 
criteria and state water areas.
Location, Parcel (0-100) (0-100) (0-100)
N3 On-Farm Benefits Uses higher of wind or water erodibility 
index
Parcel (0-100) (0-100) (0-100)
N4 Long-Term (Enduring) Benefits Likelihood that practice will persist beyond 
contract period (wetlands, trees)
Cover, Location (0-50) (0-50) (0-50)
N5 Air Quality Benefits Uses downwind population calculation by 
zipcode and parcel's wind erodibility 
factors
Location, Parcel (0-35) (0-35) (0-35)
N6 Conservation Priority Area (CPA) Parcels in CPAs; must receive at least 40% 
of the points available in the corresponding 
ranking factor
Location (0,25) (0,25) (0,25)
N7 Cost (0-150) 
a=125    
b=165
(0-150) 
a=125    
b=165
(0-150) 
a=125    
b=165
Cost Share Points for not requesting cost share 
assistance
- (0,10) (0,10) (0,10)
Below Maximum Rent Points for the rental rate below maximum 
SRR (up to $15 lower)
- (0-15) (0-15) (0-15)
Signup
Uses formula to convert offered rental rate (r):                                    
[a-(a/b*r)] + cost share points +below max points
 2 
 3 
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Table 2.  Summary statistics of CRP offers by CRD, sign-up 18 1 
State CRD PPa # Offers
mean std mean std mean std mean std
1950 0 418 $115.76 $16.28 $105.06 $13.57 $10.70 $11.04 217.8 34.7
1950 1 340 $135.50 $14.13 $117.04 $14.83 $18.46 $14.87 181.1 38.5
1940 0 472 $106.07 $15.16 $98.50 $13.68 $7.57 $10.74 211.8 33.8
1940 1 106 $133.38 $14.40 $110.64 $15.13 $22.74 $16.67 174.0 34.6
1910 0 130 $107.88 $17.19 $92.02 $14.78 $15.86 $16.11 179.6 50.0
1910 1 335 $118.85 $15.82 $98.72 $16.34 $20.13 $16.68 157.7 32.3
2750 0 335 $43.62 $14.31 $41.82 $12.54 $1.80 $3.73 171.5 36.9
2750 1 446 $79.56 $18.89 $73.14 $16.58 $6.42 $8.10 177.6 34.6
2740 0 32 $65.88 $6.77 $60.23 $9.38 $5.65 $6.65 140.9 28.1
2740 1 960 $68.91 $20.01 $63.33 $17.14 $5.59 $6.97 154.0 29.4
2710 0 36 $38.55 $5.26 $37.96 $5.02 $0.59 $1.37 185.6 25.9
2710 1 3467 $43.87 $8.10 $42.34 $7.70 $1.53 $2.83 166.0 26.7
3050 0 292 $33.44 $5.26 $33.00 $5.39 $0.45 $1.71 159.1 32.5
3050 1 58 $36.57 $4.43 $36.57 $4.43 $0.00 $0.00 164.5 31.4
3030 0 436 $30.67 $2.92 $30.14 $3.04 $0.53 $1.25 151.4 24.0
3030 1 1201 $29.94 $2.69 $29.73 $2.78 $0.21 $0.94 147.5 26.5
3890 0 28 $55.78 $7.21 $51.92 $6.55 $3.86 $4.75 139.5 22.4
3890 1 1418 $41.32 $10.50 $40.82 $10.18 $0.50 $1.61 129.1 26.8
3860 0 38 $53.02 $7.78 $51.10 $8.07 $1.92 $3.54 152.9 30.8
3860 1 862 $40.32 $6.91 $40.01 $6.75 $0.30 $1.23 151.2 22.0
3830 0 213 $45.85 $5.31 $42.20 $6.43 $3.64 $4.96 144.4 25.8
3830 1 1212 $39.66 $7.28 $38.18 $6.49 $1.48 $3.38 128.1 21.0
3840 0 267 $24.16 $2.77 $23.98 $2.74 $0.18 $0.63 116.1 30.7
3840 1 238 $32.22 $3.17 $31.65 $3.47 $0.57 $1.49 114.1 20.4
3880 0 230 $26.01 $2.14 $25.02 $2.11 $0.99 $1.56 110.9 27.0
3880 1 365 $28.57 $2.91 $28.18 $3.17 $0.39 $1.25 112.9 22.1
a PP = 0 denotes offers that did not receive the PP CPA points; PP=1 denotes offers that did. 
b  MRR is the maximum rental rate the landowner can offer; these are unique for each parcel.
c  The environmental EBI score exludes the priority-area points for factor N6 and cost factor points.
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
MT
MT
MN
MN
MN
Environmental EBI 
Scorec
IA
IA
IA
Maxmimum Rental 
Rateb
Bid Discount of Bid 
from Maximum
2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
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Table 3.  Equality of means of the components of landowners’ bids by CRD, sign-up 18 1 
State CRD PPa # Offers
mean t-statistic mean t-statistic mean t-statistic
1950 0 418 $115.76 $105.06 $10.70
1950 1 340 $135.50 $117.04 $18.46
1940 0 472 $106.07 $98.50 $7.57
1940 1 106 $133.38 $110.64 $22.74
1910 0 130 $107.88 $92.02 $15.86
1910 1 335 $118.85 $98.72 $20.13
2750 0 335 $43.62 $41.82 $1.80
2750 1 446 $79.56 $73.14 $6.42
2740 0 32 $65.88 $60.23 $5.65
2740 1 960 $68.91 $63.33 $5.59
2710 0 36 $38.55 $37.96 $0.59
2710 1 3467 $43.87 $42.34 $1.53
3050 0 292 $33.44 $33.00 $0.45
3050 1 58 $36.57 $36.57 $0.00
3030 0 436 $30.67 $30.14 $0.53
3030 1 1201 $29.94 $29.73 $0.21
3890 0 28 $55.78 $51.92 $3.86
3890 1 1418 $41.32 $40.82 $0.50
3860 0 38 $53.02 $51.10 $1.92
3860 1 862 $40.32 $40.01 $0.30
3830 0 213 $45.85 $42.20 $3.64
3830 1 1212 $39.66 $38.18 $1.48
3840 0 267 $24.16 $23.98 $0.18
3840 1 238 $32.22 $31.65 $0.57
3880 0 230 $26.01 $25.02 $0.99
3880 1 365 $28.57 $28.18 $0.39
a PP = 0 denotes offers that did not receive the PP CPA points; PP=1 denotes offers that did. 
b  MRR is the maximum rental rate the landowner can offer; these are unique for each parcel.
c  The environmental EBI score exludes the priority-area points for factor N6 and cost factor points.
-27.33***
-14.63***
-5.18***
-4.74***
2.47**
8.76***
9.83***
8.34***
3.37***
2.8**
6.12***
-3.73***
4.95***
-11.59***
-8.1***
-4.07***
-30.06***
-1.77*
-30.22***
-12.33***
-8.01***
-8.96***
-2.5**
-10.62***
0.05
-4.03***
4.46***
4.82***
-5.99***
-4.23***
4.55***
10.39***
11.03***
14.74***
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
MT
Maxmimum Rental 
Rateb
Bid Discount of Bid from 
Maximum
IA
IA
IA
MN
MN
MN
MT
-17.87***
-16.91***
-6.55***
-30.26***
-2.23**
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Table 4.  Percent of county’s agricultural land in CRP prior to sign-up1 
CRD # Counties Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
1950 12 5.2% 0.3% 11.4% 3.9% 0.4% 8.9% 3.2% 0.6% 6.9%
1940 12 5.1% 0.8% 8.8% 3.3% 0.6% 7.2% 3.5% 0.7% 7.7%
1910 12 3.7% 0.7% 7.6% 2.2% 0.6% 3.9% 1.7% 0.5% 3.1%
2750 14 4.5% 0.6% 8.5% 3.5% 0.4% 7.6% 3.3% 0.5% 7.8%
2740 12 7.1% 2.4% 12.8% 5.1% 1.9% 11.1% 5.5% 1.9% 10.7%
2710 11 16.3% 2.4% 23.4% 11.6% 1.1% 17.3% 12.6% 1.0% 20.2%
3050 10 3.6% 0.7% 5.8% 3.2% 0.5% 5.9% 3.3% 0.8% 6.5%
3030 8 10.4% 3.6% 18.5% 11.1% 3.4% 18.0% 10.9% 3.6% 15.0%
3890 7 7.5% 3.6% 11.1% 10.7% 3.1% 13.8% 9.9% 3.0% 14.0%
3860 5 5.5% 0.6% 10.8% 7.6% 0.9% 15.8% 8.2% 1.0% 19.4%
3830 7 7.5% 1.5% 11.2% 11.0% 3.4% 19.7% 11.9% 4.0% 21.0%
3840 5 5.1% 2.1% 8.5% 5.1% 2.1% 8.2% 4.2% 1.3% 6.5%
3880 5 7.1% 3.0% 11.2% 8.0% 1.7% 12.1% 6.3% 1.3% 10.6%
Signup 16 Signup 18 Signup 20
2 
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Table 5a.  Sign-up 16: Estimated marginal effect on bids evaluated at the variable means 
State CRD
Number of 
Offers
Proportion of 
Bids at their 
Maximum
R2 Constant
Maximum 
Rental Rate
Proportion of 
County in 
CRP
Environmental 
EBI†
PP
PP*EBI 
Interaction
26.522*** 0.419*** 50.059*** 0.962*** 11.032*** 1.5***
(5.205) (0.028) (18.887) (0.286) (1.362) (0.53)
20.422*** 0.413*** -45.229*** 2.523*** 5.023*** -2.173***
(3.76) (0.024) (13.068) (0.27) (1.47) (0.668)
19.851*** 0.556*** -67.917*** 0.471 2.917** -0.636
(4.462) (0.031) (22.793) (0.298) (1.275) (0.558)
6.744*** 0.443*** -26.758*** 1.021*** 2.85*** 0.959***
(1.273) (0.015) (7.481) (0.159) (0.534) (0.309)
4.74*** 0.594*** -8.923 0.939*** -0.364 -0.619
(1.697) (0.011) (7.07) (0.149) (1.238) (0.933)
9.02*** 0.352*** -6.2*** 0.081 1.015*** -0.222
(0.619) (0.011) (1.06) (0.064) (0.166) (0.145)
3.545*** 0.059*** -31.366*** 0.103** 0.416** -0.247*
(0.66) (0.017) (5.44) (0.048) (0.201) (0.138)
2.175*** 0.21*** -3.65*** -0.027 0.494*** -0.144***
(0.277) (0.012) (0.482) (0.017) (0.043) (0.034)
0.874*** 0.172*** 6.17*** -0.006 0.148 -0.025
(0.235) (0.012) (1.25) (0.023) (0.118) (0.097)
1.708*** 0.211*** -0.384 0.105*** 0.240 -0.352***
(0.483) (0.015) (1.52) (0.039) (0.188) (0.133)
4.978*** 0.21*** -17.313*** 0.257*** 0.756*** -0.615***
(0.425) (0.011) (1.49) (0.048) (0.111) (0.117)
0.98*** 0.2*** 1.640 -0.020 -0.046 0.031
(0.233) (0.02) (1.64) (0.023) (0.088) (0.047)
0.481*** 0.131*** -1.59* 0.025* 0.308*** 0.002
(0.154) (0.013) (0.866) (0.014) (0.044) (0.028)
Note: * denotes signifiance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
† The environmental EBI score exludes the priority-area points for factor N6 and cost factor points
ND 3880 833 0.825 0.973
ND 3830 1836 0.607 0.864
ND 3840 497 0.757 0.981
ND 3890 1266 0.750 0.986
ND 3860 874 0.715 0.950
MT 3050 456 0.836 0.837
MT 3030 1952 0.706 0.862
MN 2740 1941 0.148 0.795
MN 2710 2429 0.382 0.749
IA 1910 903 0.064 0.393
MN 2750 1401 0.295 0.877
IA 1950 1304 0.053 0.329
IA 1940 1016 0.081 0.461
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Table 5b.  Sign-up 18: Estimated marginal effect on bids evaluated at the variable means 
State CRD
Number of 
Offers
Proportion of 
Bids at their 
Maximum
R2 Constant
Maximum 
Rental Rate
Proportion of 
County in 
CRP
Environmental 
EBI†
PP
PP*EBI 
Interaction
18.252*** 0.504*** -1.632 1.75*** 2.099 0.497
(5.564) (0.031) (20.733) (0.304) (1.294) (0.533)
33.328*** 0.347*** -96.356*** 0.972*** -4.05*** -0.501
(4.285) (0.031) (23.071) (0.3) (1.475) (0.726)
27.768*** 0.406*** -33.230 1.742*** 2.186 1.029
(6.804) (0.044) (68.223) (0.465) (1.721) (0.829)
7.311*** 0.409*** -4.421 0.196 0.870 0.512*
(1.138) (0.019) (8.795) (0.129) (0.542) (0.263)
7.455*** 0.513*** -30.332*** 0.41*** 1.963* 0.027
(1.521) (0.015) (8.11) (0.152) (1.077) (0.858)
3.792*** 0.31*** -8.725*** 0.188*** 0.710 -0.438
(0.598) (0.009) (0.862) (0.036) (0.508) (0.401)
0.845*** 0.138*** -2.5*** 0.066*** 0.41*** -0.078**
(0.28) (0.011) (0.623) (0.019) (0.048) (0.039)
-0.011 0.162*** 4.361*** 0.122*** 0.736*** -0.142
(0.328) (0.011) (1.061) (0.032) (0.203) (0.193)
-0.312 0.113*** 2.209** 0.185*** 0.277** -0.084
(0.379) (0.012) (0.956) (0.036) (0.134) (0.113)
6.312*** 0.099*** -13.582*** 0.513*** 1.257*** -0.071
(0.641) (0.013) (1.37) (0.077) (0.176) (0.156)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.649
1.118*** 0.187*** -5.760 0.08** 0.248 0.112
(0.385) (0.022) (4.879) (0.038) (0.283) (0.078)
1.62*** 0.225*** -0.696 -0.003 0.761*** 0.182*
(0.574) (0.026) (2.57) (0.055) (0.14) (0.106)
Note: * denotes signifiance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
† The environmental EBI score exludes the priority-area points for factor N6 and cost factor points
ND 3840 505 0.760 0.950
ND 3880 595 0.703 0.820
ND 3860 900 0.850 0.965
ND 3830 1425 0.668 0.769
MT 3030 1637 0.813 0.873
ND 3890 1446 0.790 0.975
Cannot be estimated; all offers where PP = 1 are censored.
MN 2740 992 0.290 0.883
MN 2710 3503 0.572 0.357
MT 3050 350 0.897 0.919
IA 1910 465 0.097 0.271
MN 2750 781 0.423 0.931
IA 1950 758 0.146 0.503
IA 1940 578 0.254 0.512
 
40 
 
Table 5c.  Sign-up 20: Estimated marginal effect on bids evaluated at the variable means 
State CRD
Number of 
Offers
Proportion of 
Bids at their 
Maximum
R2 Constant
Maximum 
Rental Rate
Proportion of 
County in 
CRP
Environmental 
EBI†
PP
PP*EBI 
Interaction
6.430 0.537*** 30.571 2.308*** 3.09** 1.628***
(4.894) (0.029) (30.402) (0.298) (1.436) (0.553)
6.251* 0.477*** -90.404*** 1.966*** 2.009 0.065
(3.604) (0.027) (15.759) (0.262) (1.437) (0.817)
24.078*** 0.432*** -193.718* 2.331*** -2.316 3.311***
(7.797) (0.046) (104.273) (0.539) (1.878) (1.047)
5.281*** 0.349*** -26.848*** 0.585*** 2.064*** 0.337
(1.186) (0.02) (10.126) (0.16) (0.583) (0.338)
2.73*** 0.448*** -18.259** 0.508*** 2.696** 1.089*
(1.557) (0.017) (8.068) (0.149) (1.205) (0.627)
12.07*** 0.275*** -24.5*** 0.008 -2.326** -2.158
(1.25) (0.019) (1.61) (0.098) (0.961) (1.51)
1.17* 0.103*** -3.185** 0.071 0.475*** -0.137
(0.627) (0.021) (1.39) (0.044) (0.105) (0.102)
0.628* 0.112*** 0.780 0.097** 0.259 0.046
(0.378) (0.016) (1.835) (0.044) (0.213) (0.152)
0.001 0.092*** 1.910 0.047 0.791*** -0.295*
(0.528) (0.018) (1.487) (0.055) (0.233) (0.17)
2.945*** 0.16*** -8.594*** 0.384*** 2.85*** -0.612*
(0.755) (0.021) (2.461) (0.106) (0.362) (0.356)
1.667*** 0.148*** 1.500 0.079 0.189 -0.31***
(0.497) (0.026) (5.63) (0.056) (0.275) (0.117)
1.173*** 0.097*** -17.4*** 0.037 1.091*** 0.271***
(0.419) (0.027) (3.22) (0.034) (0.188) (0.076)
Note: * denotes signifiance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
† The environmental EBI score exludes the priority-area points for factor N6 and cost factor points
ND 3840 339 0.779 0.940
ND 3880 274 0.799 0.850
ND 3860 332 0.886 0.973
ND 3830 569 0.671 0.873
MT 3030 481 0.848 0.870
ND 3890 478 0.856 0.983
Cannot be estimated; all offers where PP = 1 are censored.
MN 2740 762 0.392 0.923
MN 2710 1076 0.571 0.813
MT 3050 189 0.931 0.780
IA 1910 375 0.160 0.407
MN 2750 653 0.498 0.935
IA 1950 672 0.190 0.581
IA 1940 611 0.308 0.738
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Table 6.  Tests of restrictions on marginal effects from empirical model 
Signup 16 Signup 18 Signup 20 Signup 16 Signup 18 Signup 20
-0.548*** -0.413*** -0.337*** -10.882*** -0.407 -0.966
(.300) (0.035) (0.033) (1.432) (1.503) (1.825)
-0.554*** -0.529*** -0.312*** -2.7* 6.825*** -0.062
(0.251) (0.039) (0.032) (1.566) (1.985) (2.004)
-0.394*** -0.543*** -0.475*** -2.667** -0.500 5.653**
(0.334) (0.049) (0.054) (1.354) (1.95) (2.331)
-0.38*** -0.271*** -0.291*** -2.56*** -1.203 -3.002
(0.16) (0.02) (0.021) (0.768) (1.024) (1.253)
-0.297*** -0.27*** -0.226*** 1.540 -2.211 -3.78*
(0.114) (0.014) (0.014) (1.470) (1.561) (2.105)
-0.395*** -0.24*** -0.323*** -1.602*** -1.281 5.752**
(0.143) (0.012) (0.031) (3.052) (0.124) (2.432)
-0.526*** -2.502
(0.104) (1.719)
-0.202*** -0.154*** -0.254*** -1.982*** -2.111*** -2.924***
(0.028) (0.044) (0.11) (0.173) (0.324) (0.754)
-0.12*** -0.135*** -0.136*** -0.788 -3.274*** -1.254
(0.015) (0.021) (0.046) (0.612) (1.087) (1.698)
-0.179*** -1.099*** -0.082*** -0.528 -0.729 -7.427***
(0.027) (0.039) (0.072) (0.731) (1.075) (2.025)
-0.366*** -0.653*** -0.463*** -1.504*** -2.621*** -8.267***
(0.018) (0.036) (0.046) (0.342) (0.612) (1.179)
-0.104*** -0.135** -0.272*** 0.116 -0.774 -0.544
(0.039) (0.061) (0.083) (0.415) (1.318) (1.472)
-0.102*** -0.193*** -0.123*** -1.933*** -2.731*** -9.527***
(0.035) (0.071) (0.138) (0.321) (0.574) (1.818)
Restriction estimates and standard errors are reported.
Note: * denotes signifiance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
3830
ND 3840
ND 3880
3030
ND 3890
ND 3860
2740
MN 2710
MT 3050
1940
IA 1910
MN 2750
CRD Test of Restriction:               Test of Restriction:         
IA 1950
State
IA
MN
MT
ND
Cannot be estimated; all offers 
where PP = 1 are censored.
Cannot be estimated; all offers 
where PP = 1 are censored.
1 1β = 1 2η η=
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Figure 2. The Prairie Pothole National Conservation Priority Area (shaded counties) 
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End Notes 
                                                            
1 The 43rd sign-up was a general sign-up period through April 13, 2012 and enrolled 3.9 million acres.   
2 A historical and institutional accounting of the program is provided in Jacobs (2010).  
3 Thurman (1995), Cochrane and Runge (1992) and Orden, Paarlberg and Roe (1999) provide discussions 
of the early CRP and implications of the conservation policies resulting from the 1985 Farm Bill. 
4 Miranda (1992) used offers data from the first sign-up to examine whether or not landowners formulate 
their offer to account for future on-farm productivity gains that result from reduced soil erosion in the 
post contract period. Other work that followed also incorporated the idea that landowners should account 
for soil productivity gains when the land reverts to production.  Intuitively, we expect that landowners 
consider the benefits to future productivity from reduced soil erosion, increased soil organic matter, etc.  
In the current EBI scoring mechanism, the N3 factor (see table 1) assigns points to cover types based on 
the expectation that soil productivity gains accrue; however, there has been no formal identification in the 
literature that soil productivity does actually increase in the post contract period.   
5 The precise ranking criterion of the index was “black box” in the sense that the rules for determining 
each offer’s rank or score were not released. However, we do know that the index was comprised of seven 
conservation and environmental goals, which are:  1) surface water quality improvement, 2) potential for 
ground water improvement, 3) soil productivity preservation, 4) providing assistance to farmers 
negatively affected by conservation compliance, 5) encouragement of tree plantings, 6) preference for 
hydrologic unit areas identified by the Water Quality Initiative, and, 7) enrollment in conservation priority 
areas.  Acceptance into the CRP was determined by the Consolidated Farm Service Agency based on 
eligibility criteria and some comparison of the landowners bid and a cropland rental rate target.  
6 The EBI used for general sign-ups 15, 16, 18, and 20 had six environmental factors.  These are provided 
in Table 1.  In the 26th general sign-up and those since, only the first five environmental factors (N1 
through N5) remain.  The sixth – the Conservation Priority Area – was absorbed into the other ranking 
factors and acts as a “multiplier” of other expected benefits. 
7 The cost factor formula contains parameters set by the administrators after all offers have been received. 
A landowner’s  bid score is a linear transformation of his bid relative to a maximum per-acre dollar value 
set by the program’s administrators after all offers in a sign-up have been submitted.  The formula is 
1 cost share points + points below maximum rent, ra
b
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ where a  weights the bid score in the 
overall EBI score and b sets a maximum rental rate the USDA will pay for any acres in the CRP. Both 
are set by the USDA and unknown to landowners at the time of bidding.  For sign-ups 16, 18, and 20, 
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125a =  and 165.b =   A landowner can receive 10 points for not requesting cost sharing of the 
conservation cover installation and can receive 1 point for every whole dollar discount in his bid relative 
to the parcel’s maximum soil rental rate, up to 15 points.  The parcel’s maximum rental rate is determined 
by the county of the parcel, the predominant three soil series on the parcel, and the rental rate assigned to 
each of the soil series.   
8 A county committee assigns soil-specific rental rates in the CRP to individual soil series.  These are 
intended to reflect the dry-land cash rental rate of the soil.  A similar soil series in one county may not 
have the same rental rate as the same soil series in an adjacent county or in another state.  A parcel of land 
may contain one or several soil series, but the predominant three are used to establish the weighted 
average soil rental rate.  Therefore, the weighted soil rental rate and county combination results in a 
parcel-specific maximum bid in the CRP.  
9 The USDA knows current and expiring CRP acreage at any given time and decides how large the next 
general sign-up will be subject to the acreage limits set forth in the Farm Bill.   
10 This is an abstraction from the complex EBI formula but reflects the true form of the index in that the 
EBI is the sum of cost and non-cost components. The cost component is linear in the landowner’s bid.    
11 The alternative use for the land is assumed to be agricultural production. CRP rules require enrolled 
land to have a recent cropping history or have been continuously enrolled in the CRP.  Other land use 
choices can be modeled in this framework without altering the results.  
12 The net non-pecuniary benefits ( )( )b N are unobserved but known to the landowner.  They include his 
expected increase in future on-farm productivity and measures of the private benefits associated with 
conservation and open space amenities that result from enrolling land in the CRP net of enrollment and 
practice-installation costs.  A standard assumption with regard to these benefits is that the landowner has 
private information about the future on-farm and other benefits that accrue as a result of CRP enrollment 
(Marra and Vukina 1998, Vukina et al. 2008).  
13 Landowners make a 10-year decision when submitting an offer to enroll in the CRP.  Because both 
expected returns to agricultural production and the return to CRP enrollment are discounted by the same 
rate over the same horizon, we do not explicitly account for discounting in the theoretical model.  The 
theoretical results would not change if discounting were incorporated explicitly. 
14 It is a common misperception that landowners in a county face the same maximum bid price or that a 
landowner’s bid score in the EBI depends on his bid relative to a county average.  This is not the case in a 
general sign-up after sign-up 13.  Each bid submitted has a unique soil specific maximum rental rate that 
is known to the landowner when he makes the offer.  The components of the scoring formula are provided 
in end note 7 and in table 1. 
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15 The ambiguity of the effect on 0r from a change in N derives from the size of the changes in MB and 
MC.  An exogenous increase in EBI points leapfrogs a bidder ahead of others and places him in a 
different part of the distribution of offers.  If that part of the distribution of EBI scores is “thicker” with 
offers, then the benefit of further increases in 0e by reducing 0r can be large and the optimal response of 
0r  to an increase in N can be negative. Conversely, the new position in the distribution occasioned by the 
increase in N  could result in low expected gains to further bid reductions. 
16 We are not attempting to explain changes in participation due to conservation priority areas or other 
exogenous points but rather changes to bidding behavior conditional on being inside or outside the CPA.  
If participation is increased or decreased because of the CPA points, then we want to capture the bidding 
behavior.  By comparing bids across counties on opposite sides of CPA boundaries, we measure the effect 
of CPA designation on the bids of those who would select into the bidding process with or without CPA 
designation, but also include the effect of CPA designation on bidding participation.  This combining of 
the two effects is policy relevant in that it estimates the total budget-and-enrollment-relevant response to a 
counterfactual change in CPA designation.  We are grateful to a reviewer for pointing out the two 
possible channels of influence from such a counterfactual change in designation. 
17 Sign-up 18 is provided as a sample to highlight the data and its characteristics.  Summary statistics for 
sign-ups 16 and 20 are similar and available upon request.   
18 The tests were conducted with and without the assumption of equal variances using a standard pooled t-
test and Satterthwaite’s test when variances are not equal. 
19 Because the priority area dummy variable implies an additional 25 points in the EBI, we divide each 
offer’s environmental EBI score by 25 for the estimation; this permits a more straightforward comparison 
of the marginal effects of additional points.   
20 Other land and owner characteristics may also influence CRP bidding and participation, such as age of 
operator, succession and estate plans, total farm size, and spread of the farming operation.  Controlling for 
these variables would increase the statistical efficiency of our estimator of the CPA designation effect, but 
we have no way of identifying the demographic characteristics of bidders in the USDA data 
21 That an offer’s maxir reflects the opportunity cost of land also means that it can be used to control for the 
differences in land quality between two offers – one inside a Prairie Pothole designated county and one in 
a county adjacent to a Prairie Pothole county in the same CRD – that are otherwise identical, particularly 
those differences that arise due to the unique nature of the pothole region that may influence agricultural 
productivity and returns to it. 
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22 The United States Secretary of Agriculture can, under special circumstances, approve a county’s 
request to exceed this limit. To our knowledge and based on our data, this allowance has not been 
exercised in the region we analyze. 
23 The validity of the Tobit estimator depends on the assumption of normality of the disturbance. In the 
absence of normality, the Tobit estimator has been shown to result in inconsistent estimates (Goldberger 
1983). Tests for normality have been proposed (Newey 1987, Vella 1989) but these alternative tests are 
also problematic in finite sample applications and may not be reliably consistent under the null and 
alternative hypothesis in many cases (Jeong and Jeong 2010).  While we acknowledge the challenges of 
using Tobit estimators, it remains the most appropriate available estimation technique for our purposes.   
24An alternative specification to the one analyzed here would be one in which the dependent variable was 
the participant’s bid expressed as a fraction of the maximum allowable bid: .imax
i
r
r
  By moving the 
maximum allowable bid from the right-hand side of the equation to the denominator of the left-hand side, 
the specification becomes amenable to analysis by fractional regression methods.  See Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996) for the seminal contribution.  The fraction just mentioned is an interesting and 
meaningful economic summary of the bid and allows ready comparison of bids across counties and soil 
series.  We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this alternative empirical specification.  In the results 
presented here, we maintain a specification with maxr  on the right-hand side so as to not restrict the CRP 
bid to move in proportion to changes in the maximum allowable bid and to allow us to investigate the 
differential responses of actual bids to maximum bids across crop reporting districts.  We note that 
maximum bid emerges as an important empirical determinant of actual bids, statistically significant with 
relatively low standard errors. 
25 We are grateful for comments on earlier drafts that caused us to consider a linear regression strategy as 
a means of comparison of our censored regression estimates.  A linear estimation strategy would treat all 
offers as unconstrained, and the greater the proportion of constrained bids the larger the difference we 
would expect between the linear coefficient estimates and estimated marginal effects from the censored 
regression.  Coefficient estimates from the linear regression model were found to have the same sign as 
our reported Tobit marginal effects; the primary difference between the two estimation strategies is in the 
statistical significance of the estimates and the magnitude of the marginal effect, particularly in cases 
where a larger number of observations on bids are constrained. 
26 A comprehensive treatment of learning would require panel data to relate a change in an individual’s 
bidding behavior to past experience.  A referee has suggested that changes in the average bids over time 
by CRD could also reveal the effects of learning.  This is a useful suggestion but one that we do not take 
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up in the present paper.  Instead, we separate our analysis by sign-up and do not assume the behavioral 
parameters to be constant over time, which they might not be under the influence of learning.  While this 
insulates our empirics from misspecification that could be induced in a panel model by learning, it does 
not allow us to investigate the issue.  Whether or not the effects of learning are dramatic enough to be 
picked up in the short time series of signups at the CRD level is a question that we leave for future 
research. 
